The case is made that the path to AGI through cognitive and developmental robotics is compelling. Beyond the familiar argument that it keeps researchers honest by forcing their systems to cope with the real world, it encourages them to recapitulate the evolutionary developmental path which gave rise to intelligence in humans. Insights from this perspective are embodied in the Servo Stacks cognitive architecture with several salient features. The brain evolved as a body controller and thus is based largely on computational structures appropriate to physical process control. Evolution typically copies existing structure and modies it minimally to meet a new demand. We should therefore expect the higher cognitive functions to be performed by body controllers pressed into service as brain controllers.
Introduction and Motivation
The brain evolved as a body controller; except for size, the human brain is structurally similar to that of other primates. Neocortex in surprisingly homogeneous, suggesting a general computing fabric instead of hard-wired functional modules. This uniformity has been cited as a strong argument for a common computational function (Mountcastle 1978 ). An argument can thus be made that evolution took a computing substrate evolved for body control and simply extended it to support the complex cognitive functions of symbolic ratiocination characteristic of human intelligence.
The Servo Stacks architecture is an attempt to use this insight as a guide in developing a general articial intelligence. For example, there is some evidence that the neural structures which manipulate grammar and language developed from, or indeed overlap, the ones which produce nely nuanced and sequenced manipulations by the hands. Thus we feel that insight into the former may be gained by investigating the latter, particularly to the extent of identifying mechanisms that might be responsible for compliant dexterity and seamless uidity in both domains.
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It is common in higher-level cognitive architectures for there to be a chain something like sensory input to interpretation to cogitation to action sequencing to motor output. In evolution, however, the structure of a simpler animal is usually augmented by adding a controller to the top the entire lower-form structure, giving rise to a laminar structure with crosstalk between input and output at each level. This form is clearly reected in the control architectures of modern robotics as pioneered in (Brooks 1986 ).
To extend this laminar control architecture to be a more general-purpose cognitive system, we reinterpret For example, we might have lower-level servos concerned with pressure patterns on the skin and muscle activation strengths; a higher level with joint angles and speeds; higher yet with step-taking and foot placement; then room-to-room navigation; then the task of serving coee; then the entertainment of guests, and so forth.
Given this general form for a cognitive architecture, the key open questions are
• Can a single general model of servo be developed that is appropriate to a broad range of these levels? If so, the notion that the brain grows by copying and modifying existing servos, both evolutionarily and in individual mental development, would gain increased cogency.
• The servos in a working model of mind will not form a simple linear stack but a complex network, which must support varying patterns of communication for dierent overall cognitive tasks and states. How is this done?
• For mental growth and learning, new servos, with new internal languages, must be formed to implement the ability to think in new abstractions about new concepts. How are they created, programmed, and connected?
After examining these we will return to the question of a specic architecture.
A Symbolic Servo
Upon seeing the algorithm of Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver, John McCarthy quipped, It's a symbolic servo.
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A standard process-control servo receives a control input signal s (the setpoint) and a feedback signal f from the process (called the plant) to be controlled.
These two signals must be commensurate, e.g. both a measure of engine speed. The servo then adjusts some controllable parameter p of the plant based on a function of the control and feedback signals.
If the servo has a memory of enough cases, arranged as triples (f 0 , f 1 , p) (e.g. the value of the feedback signal before and after setting the output to p), case-based control can obtained by using p from the tuple where f 0 is closest to current feedback f , and f 1 is nearest the current control input s. We refer to this as a sigma (si tuation / goal / memory / action) to distinguish it from standard formulations of servo or state machine. In our model, each signal has a strength as well as a value; at zero strength, it acts as a don't-care, and at partial strength it acts as a bias in case the other inputs incompletely determine a memory record, but can be overriden by stronger signals on other inputs. More precisely, each signal is a vector whose components individually have strengths.
If suciently populated, the stored trajectories form a manifold in the memory space, which is equivalent to an equation (or system of them) which forms a model of the observed behaviors. Typically the manifold will be a p-valued function of (f, s)-space, and generally interpreted as a function selected by s in f -space.
If some of the dimensions of the space are time derivatives of others, it forms a dynamical systems model (equivalent to a system of dierential equations). In the absence of such derivatives, the sigma can either be 1 As related by Marvin Minsky at AAAI FSS 2001, North Falmouth, MA clocked to obtain state-machine behavior or allowed to run free, in which case it will nd xed points of its function.
A sigma can be used in a variety of modes, depending on its inputs: 
Signals and Representation
Analogy (Hofstadter 1995) and blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2003) have both been suggested as key basic operations that a cognitive architecture must implement. It is instructive to note that vectors of real numbers support both these operations as simple geometric combinations, while representing concepts as complex as a recognizable sketch of a human face (Churchland 1986; 2005) . Although at higher levels of abstraction it is surely the case that more complex structures and operations will be necessary to support analogy and blending, it seems reasonable to begin with a primitive representation that provides a head start.
The physical signals in Servo Stacks are xed-length numeric vectors of length n (n = 1024 in current experiments), but support an arbitrary number of notional signals. The components of the notional signals are given a superimposed coding as sums of randomlychosen base vectors in the physical signal space. Any two such vectors have a high probability of being nearly orthogonal (Kanerva 1988) . Any port on any sigma can be connected to any other port, with a high probability that notional signals unknown to the receiver will simply be ignored (by virtue of being orthogonal to the active manifold). Notional signals can be generated locally without the need of an overall registry, and can be combined simply by adding physical signals. Hereinafter, we shall ignore the encoding and refer only to the notional signal vectors of arbitrary length.
Such vectors can obviously record the position in conguration space of an arm, or be interpreted as a raster (including the areal functions of dynamic neural eld theory (Erlhagen and Bicho 2006) ), or specify force values for muscles. However, throughout most of the architecture, they will typically record the activation of, and signals to be sent to, sets of other sigmas. In the sense that such a vector can be thought of as representing a situation as recognized or understood by the other sigmas, it functions as a frame (Minsky 1975 At the lower sensorimotor levels, the recongurability of the sigmas is not important, and indeed there may be a level below which they are hard-wired and cognitively impenetrable. However, at higher levels where sigmas represent concepts such as words and goal-directed actions, recongurability is crucial to the use of the network as a fabric of representation. The same set of sigmas can be used to recognize an action, imagine doing it, predict its eects, and actually to perform it.
Recursion and Concepts
We posit a mechanism similar to Minsky's k-line (Minsky 1980) , which can record all the network elements active at a given point, but also able to record their (Fodor 1975; .
Perhaps the most important question one can ask of a cognitive architecture is how it represents concepts. In the common quip, something is a duck if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck. Rather than representing a duck as some static datastructure essentially equivalent to a dictionary entry, an ASC represents a duck with an active working machine that is capable of recognizing a duck, simulating a duck, and even imitating a duck. This is the active subnet which activates and connects all the sigmas which store duck-relevant trajectories.
Note again that ASCs are manipulated, not by some Play, Practice, and Imitation
Evidence ranging from visually deprived kittens (Wiesel and Hubel 1963) to language-deprived children (Sacks 1989) indicates that appropriate sensory experience is necessary for the development of cognitive ability across a wide range of levels of organization. The same phenomenon would aect our sigma, which would be incompetent at its task in the absence of a populated memory. By far the major mode of human learning is imitation. After a sigma records the experience of someone else doing an action, the action may be imitated substituting oneself for the original actor in the ASC. This will rarely be perfect, but it gives the student mind a scaolding upon which to improve by practice.
An Architecture
The testbed for Servo Stacks is an upper-torso anthropoid robot in the genre of Cog (Brooks et al. 1999 ).
The robot is intended to be able to learn enough skills and concepts to be roughly the equivalent of a SHRDLU (Winograd 1972) , but with physical cameras, manipulators, wooden blocks and table, and hearing and responding in spoken language.
Given the demanding computational and memory requirements of the Servo Stacks model, particularly the associative memory of the sigmas, it seems likely that processing power will form a substantial bottleneck for the near future. We consider this appropriate, however: any biologically inspired theory of the mind must take into account the substantial apparent processing power of the brain (Merkle 1987) . Any such theory whose computational requirements t available computer hardware too neatly seems suspiciously ad hoc.
Autogenous Kernel
We are primarily concerned with the ability of a mind to learn and grow. We adopt the basic architecture of a self-extending system from (Hall 1999) , which species an autogenous kernel with irreducibly basic self-construction capabilities, which builds, in successive layers, a series of extensions that have both more general capabilities and more sophisticated selfconstruction abilities.
In a cognitive architecture, the kernel consists of some basic sensorimotor sigmas, pre-programmed with records that allow for infant-like activities like waving arms and learning to track them with eyes. Perhaps more importantly, it contains higher-level sigmas preprogrammed with records that allow them to do basic The process starts with a handful of data-mining heuristics that are applied more or less at random to all the signals in the system. In early experiments these are Kohonen map formation, other standard dimensionality reduction techniques such as PCA, and hierarchical clustering using anity propagation (Frey and Dueck 2007) .
Sigmas generated this way are run in prediction mode and compete in an agoric/genetic ecosystem (Hall, Steinberg, and Davison 1998) • Vision and manipulation converge at a low level to allow a fairly tight hand-eye coordination control loop.
The upper end of this conuence feeds into an objectmodel stack.
• At a somewhat higher level, vision and hearing converge at the level of letters/words, feeding into a language stack.
• The language stack and object model converge at a level such that model semantics are active in sentence parsing, as in SHRDLU.
When the robot hears the sentence, Dutch the blue blog, the sigmas which store word and syntax-related trajectories words are trajectories through phonemes, sentences are trajectories through words are congured to perform a spreading-activation parse similar to a Jones APN (Jones 1983; Jones and Driscoll 1985) .
There is enough feedback in this process to force the 
Related Work
Servo Stacks falls squarely in the eld of cognitive robotics (Clark and Grush 1999; Sloman et al. 2006 ).
It shares in particular a strong concern for ontogenetic development with such projects as iCub (Tsagarakis et al. 2007) . It is distinguished from many of the specic eorts in developmental robotics (Lungarella et al. 2003) , however, by focussing on function, representation, and organization at a higher level than a neural network model (Shanahan 2006) The notion of simply using the full record of experience as a model is generally referred to in AI as case-based reasoning (Kolodner 1992) . Some of the neural-network approaches that allow one-shot learning are the original Hopeld network (with its Hebbian programming algorithm) (Hopeld 1982) and Aleksander's G-RAM neural unit model (Aleksander 1990 ).
Servo Stacks might be implemented in either of these; for example, similar in spirit to our use of sigmas as associative-memory based sequencers is Orponen's programming language for Hopeld nets (Orponen and Prost 1996). However, for any digital simulation, an exhaustive search of a vector list is as fast as one single iteration of a Hopeld relaxation, so we choose instead to concentrate on the abstract properties of proximity in n-spaces and assume that conventional techniques can be developed to implement them eciently (Shakhnarovich, Darrell, and Indyk 2006; Garcia, Debreuve, and Barlaud 2008) .
